NOT TODAY,
BRAINIAC

IDENTITY ROLE EVIDENCE03

INSIDE ISSUE 03 / SECURITY FILE

The same desk. Different authority.

The help desk is working, and its security is more than a diagram. Fifteen human accounts were verified in Active Directory and imported into GLPI. All have Self-Service access; Barbara and Ted also have Technician profiles and IT Service Desk membership. The directory audit read back all 49 expected non-service group memberships.

The directory-to-desk boundary

AD establishes the synthetic identities and groups; GLPI profiles determine service-desk permissions. Five workforce articles and four technician references were imported with separate audiences. Model-level checks showed Clark could see the workforce set while Barbara and Ted could see the technician references; anonymous reading was denied.

A denied path, not just an assigned role

Ted signed in over trusted HTTPS with Technician and Self-Service profiles. In the recorded browser check, switching to Self-Service and opening ticket 9 produced a permission denial. That is a real exercised boundary. It is not proof that every requester, ticket, and admin path has been exhaustively tested.

The ticketing checks stay on record

The human desk handled multiple tickets. Ted’s public responses on training tickets 4–9 were read back, while private evidence from a controlled WS03 connectivity-fault recovery was placed on ticket 6. The HTTPS, isolated restore, and service-restart checks each have their own receipts. These are security and resilience checks around the desk—not actions performed by HackBot.

WHAT REMAINS TO TEST

Extend the observed denial into a full role-by-role matrix: unrelated requester tickets, administrator controls, both named technicians working the queue, and the remaining six-scenario outcomes. A strong checked slice is not the entire access model.

HackBot is the comic-book lens for this file, not a live lab operator. Original artwork; no DC affiliation or endorsement.

NOT TODAY,BRAINIAC

NOT TODAY,
BRAINIAC