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TWILIGHT TECH LABSTHE ENGINEERING PROJECT BOOK

ENGINEERING INDEX / ENTRY 18

CASE 18 / SESSION SECURITY / REUSE RESPONSE

A replayed token closes the session family.

A stolen old refresh token should not quietly work after a legitimate device rotates its credential.

Source project: A Place to Show UpFocused security tests passedReviewed September 25, 2026
01 / THE ENGINEERING QUESTION

What happens if an old refresh token is replayed after rotation?

02 / THE SYSTEM

Where the handoffs happen.

The tested auth path rejects replay, revokes the entire refresh family including the newer token, and records a reuse-detection audit action. The legitimate user must log in again.

  1. 01Issue refresh family
  2. 02Rotate token
  3. 03Detect old-token reuse
  4. 04Revoke family and audit
03 / THE CLAIM LEDGER

What the record earns.

Rotation, replay detection, family revocation, and audit tested.

Observed receipt
On September 25, 2026, APTSU authz-matrix tests passed within a 33-test integration/security batch, including refresh rotation and reuse detection.
Source and scope
APTSU app/core/auth.py and tests/security/test_authz_matrix.py; dirty checkout HEAD 930369a at inspection.
04 / THE LIMIT

What this does not prove.

Local tests do not establish device compromise handling, provider-level revocation, or a security assessment of the complete deployed authentication surface.

05 / NEXT PROOF

Where the work goes next.

Rehearse a real client refresh/reuse sequence and verify audit visibility, user recovery, and rate limits.